Truth of fiction versus truth in fiction by Ryan, Marie-Laure
 Between, vol. IX, n. 18 (Novembre/November 2019)  
ISSN 2039-6597 
DOI: 10.13125/2039-6597/3843 
Truth of fiction 




Literary experiments that combine verifiable statements and fictional 
invention have led to the often-expressed opinion that the border between fact 
and fiction is collapsing. In a time when concepts such as post-truth and 
truthiness threaten to replace the distinction between fact and fiction with 
panfictionality, it is imperative to find a way to accommodate hybrid texts 
without sacrificing the border. This article explores different levels of truth in 
fictional texts, from truth of fiction to truth in fiction, as well as different ways 
to deal with hybrid texts, from continuum-based models to binary models, and 
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Truth of fiction versus truth in fiction 
Marie-Laure Ryan 
The problem of the truth of fiction has been debated by 
philosophers at least since the advent of analytic philosophy, but as long 
as deconstruction reigned supreme in literary theory, it was largely 
ignored by narratologists and literary critics, who considered the 
concept of truth a non-issue because literature was supposed to be about 
language, not about external referents. In 1994, Peter Lamarque and 
Stein Haugom Olsen published a masterful treaty titled Truth, Fiction 
and Literature, but at that time literary theory was still under the spell of 
postmodern skepticism with respect to the notion of truth, and the book 
was therefore only noticed by the kind of critics who were familiar with 
the philosophical approaches to fiction.  
This situation changed within narratology around 2015 when 
Henrik Skov Nielsen, James Phelan and Richard Walsh published an 
article titled “Ten Theses about Fictionality” in the journal Narrative 
which promoted a theory of fiction known as the rhetorical theory. Even 
though this theory is not an embrace of the philosophical work that 
preceded it but rather an alternative, it takes the question of truth much 
more seriously than most other approaches, especially literary ones. In 
this article, I will compare the rhetorical theory with the one I personally 
endorse, a conception of fiction based on the notion of possible world 
inspired by Lewis (1978) that also borrows ideas from Searle (1975) and 
Walton (1990), in terms of their handling of the notion of truth. By truth 
I will not mean what Walton calls “fictional truth”, i.e. what counts as 
fact within the storyworld, nor the possibility to make true statements 
about non-existing entities, an issue much debated by philosophical 
approaches (Kroon and Voltolini 2018), but rather the use by authors or 
inference by readers of propositions that correspond to individual facts 
or general laws of the actual world.  
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The purpose of the rhetorical approach is to free the concept of 
fictionality from what the authors call “generic fiction” – this is to say, 
literary forms such as novels and short stories, as well as fiction films – 
and to outline instead a theory that encompasses a wide variety of 
utterances: not only literary narratives, but also “hypotheticals, 
counterfactuals, speculations, and other deviations from the actual” 
(Nielsen et al. 2015: 64). Here is the theory in a nutshell: “Fictive 
discourse neither refers to actual states of affairs nor tries to deceive its 
audience about such states. Instead it overtly invents or imagines states 
of affairs in order to accomplish some purpose(s) within its original 
context” (2015: 63). According to the authors, the faculty of invention 
manifests itself in many genres of discourse: in informal conversation, 
through jokes and “kidding around”, in political speeches, through 
projections, in sermons, through parables, and in philosophy, through 
thought experiments. As an example of spontaneous, non-literary 
fictionality, the authors mention Barack Obama’s claim that Mitt 
Romney, his opponent in the 2012 election for U.S. President, suffered 
from “Romneysia”, a condition obviously invented by Obama. Through 
this pun on amnesia, Obama wanted to remind his audience that while 
Mitt Romney was governor of Massachusetts, he installed a universal 
insurance plan, which he later rejected when he ran for U.S. President.  
A distinctive feature of the rhetorical approach is that it does not 
use any notion of fictional world: it divides statements into fictional 
ones, which are obviously invented, and factual ones, which describe 
reality. A text can therefore be a blend of fiction and fact. In a world-
based conception of fiction (such as Lewis 1978, Pavel 1986, Walton 1990 
and Ryan 1991), by contrast, the difference between factual and fictional 
discourse is a matter of reference world. Factual discourse describes the 
real world, while fiction creates an imaginary world, and asks the 
audience to imagine it for its own sake, which means, to make-believe 
the statements that describe it , to pretend that it is real, and to construct 
it mentally on the basis of fictional facts. Following Walton, the 
difference between factual and fictional statements can be captured as 
“telling to be believed” vs. “telling to be imagined”. The reference world 
of fiction, also known as fictional world or storyworld, can stand at 
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various distances from the actual world, from nearly identical (yet 
logically distinct) to very remote, as in fantastic texts1.  
The problem of truth in fiction arises on several levels. First there is 
what I call in my title the “truth of fiction”. Throughout the history of 
philosophy, the word truth has always had very positive connotations, 
in fact philosophy can be defined as the search for truth, so that by 
arguing for the truth of fiction we argue for its moral value and for its 
usefulness. Reading fiction should not be an escapist activity, a flight 
into some fantasy realm, but a learning experience from which we can 
extract valuable lessons about the real world. As Nielsen et al. declare: 
“Fictive discourse is not ultimately a means of constructing scenarios 
that are cut off from the actual world, but rather a means of negotiating 
an engagement with that world” (2015: 63). As an example of the “truth 
of fiction” they propose a text that departs very obviously from reality, 
namely the young adult novel The Hunger Games by Susanne Collins. 
 Several times Collins shows Katniss facing either/or choices 
where both options are ethically unacceptable, and then shows how 
Katniss finds a way to refuse the either/or and instead to transform 
the entire structure of the situation. Thus, the fictional Katniss 
provides a model that we can try to emulate, though of course we 
have to find our particular solutions to our particular dilemmas. 
(2015: 71) 
This moral can be considered the truth of The Hunger Games. It is 
largely independent of the truth of the individual statements that make 
up the text, since the text represents a dystopian society that, fortunately, 
differs widely from the real world. The idea that literature should 
provide a lesson for the real world, rather than merely entertaining the 
reader with an interesting plot, is so deeply ingrained that some critics 
 
1 An unresolved issue with world-based approaches is whether the 
reference worlds of fiction have to be logically consistent. Does a text that 
contains contradiction still create a world? Only if we accept the paradoxical 
notion of impossible possible worlds. 
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will propose the vaguest message to justify a work. To wit, this review 
of Ian McEwan’s Machines Like Me: “Strip away the counterfactual 
wrapping and Machines Like Me is ultimately about the age-old question 
of what makes people human” (“Who, Robot?”, 2019: 76). Different 
readers will of course extract different truths from a given text, and this 
is why the interpretation of literary texts is such an endless and 
fascinating debate. 
It is not my intent to question this interpretation of truth as 
synonymous with ethical value and as guarantee of the significance of 
fiction (and, by extension, of literature). But is this kind of abstract truth 
distinctive of fiction, or is it just a possibility, a nice bonus, perhaps a 
feature that distinguish great narratives from the not-so-great kind? If 
the label “literature” is considered honorific, then indeed the essence of 
literariness could be conceived as the ability to convey this kind of truth; 
but fiction is a logical category, not an inherently aesthetic one, which 
means there is good and bad fiction, instructive and escapist kinds, and 
we cannot regard the ability to convey truths-for-the-real-world as 
distinctive of fiction. Of the millions of fans of J.R.R. Tolkien’s Lord of The 
Rings, it is likely that many of them never ask themselves what the text 
tells them about the real world. They just enjoy the fictional world for its 
own sake. Lamarque and Olsen are clear on this point: this kind of truth 
is possible, even desirable, but it is not constitutive of the fictional 
experience. Nor is it necessary of the literary experience. 
While the kind of truth discussed above is the product of the 
reader’s interpretation, and is not explicitly stated in the text, the second 
level consists of general statements – known as gnomic statements – that 
are directly expressed, and that convey specific propositions. These 
propositions are quantified by the universal operator of logic: “all x” 
rather than “some x”. A good example is the famous first sentence of 
Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina: “Happy families are all alike; every unhappy 
family is unhappy in its own way”. This second level of truth provides 
a bridge between “truth of fiction” and “truth in fiction”. A statement 
like “all happy families” should be verified by the plot of the novel, and 
if the plot convincingly supports it, the statement should be regarded as 
true for the fiction (or as true in the fictional world). But if it is taken as 
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an aphorism that describes the real world, it is also representative of 
what I have called the truth of fiction. Readers could decide that “all 
families” is true of the fictional world, because it is convincingly 
supported by the story, but false in the real world, because they know 
some counterexamples.  
World-based theories of fiction can account for this discrepancy by 
relying on what philosopher Jaakko Hintikka (1988) calls “language as 
calculus”, a conception of language according to which, rather than 
being limited to the real word, a given proposition can be evaluated 
separately for several different worlds. Just as “unicorns exist” is true of 
the world of fairy tales but false of the real world, and just as “Paris 
exists” is true of both the real world and of the world of Proust’s A La 
recherche du temps perdu, so Tolstoy’s sentence can be assigned a separate 
truth value for the real world and for the world of Anna Karenina. The 
rhetorical theory does not allow such double evaluation since the only 
world it recognizes is the real world.  
Tolstoy’s sentence has been parodied by Nabokov, who begins Ada 
or Ardor with this statement: “All happy families are more or less 
dissimilar, all unhappy ones are more or less alike”. Which one is more 
true ? And does it matter for the reader’s appreciation of Tolstoy’s or 
Nabokov’s novels? According to Lamarque and Olsen, “[p]erhaps the 
first feature to notice concerning the discourse about literature which 
one finds in criticism and conversation is that it does not contain much 
debate about the truth-value of [general] propositions” (332). In other 
words, critics of Anna Karenina and of Ada do not really care whether 
their first sentence is true or false. I cannot speak for all ordinary readers, 
but many of them (including myself) enjoy these texts because of their 
plot, their characters, their style, their setting, and not because of the 
wisdom they express. An author like Balzac is full of general statements 
about women which, in the current cultural climate, would be 
unacceptable, but this has not damaged his status as one of the literary 
giants of the 19th century, and I suspect that many contemporary 
readers rather enjoy, tongue in cheek, his prejudiced claims about 
women, as examples of how cultural attitudes have changed since the 
19th century.  
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The third level of truth, which I call “truth in fiction”, consists of 
textually present individual statements concerning specific entities, 
rather than of general statements. These statements are modified by the 
existential quantifier, “for a certain x, p”, rather than by the universal 
quantifier, “for all x, p”. An example is Tolstoy describing Napoleon as 
the leader of the French armies that fought the czar’s armies at Borodino 
in 1812. It is no secret that novels, especially realistic and historical ones, 
can contain statements that happen to be true in the real world. Many 
authors engage in extensive research before writing novels that take 
place in determinate historical, geographical and cultural settings, and 
it is not uncommon for readers to learn something about the real world 
from reading fiction. For instance I learned a lot about medieval 
theology from The Name of the Rose by Umberto Eco, because I trust the 
scholarship of the author. But this learning must be placed under the 
warning caveat lector: one could never quote knowledge gained from a 
novel in a history book.  
Once again, the rhetorical and the world-based approaches treat 
this issue differently. The rhetorical approach distinguishes a global and 
a local level of fictionality; these two levels are relatively independent of 
each other, so that there can be local fictionality in a globally factual text, 
and vice-versa, local factuality in a globally fictional text. For instance, 
the example mentioned above of Obama accusing Romney of 
Romneysia is a fictional island in an otherwise nonfictional speech 
aiming at persuasion. The reverse case of islands of factuality within a 
global fiction is illustrated by truth in fiction2. Such an approach explains 
 
2 A philosopher who agrees with the proponents of the rhetorical theory 
in treating texts that use both true facts and invention as patchworks of fiction 
and nonfiction is John Searle: “Most fictional stories contain nonfictional 
elements: along with the pretended references to Sherlock Holmes and Watson, 
there are in Sherlock Holmes real references to London and Baker street and 
Paddington Station; again, in War and Peace, the story of Pierre and Natacha is 
a fictional story about fictional characters, but the Russia of War and Peace is 
the real Russia, and the war against Napoleon is the real war against the real 
Napoleon” (Searle 1975: 330). 
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how readers can learn facts from fiction, but only if they are able to 
detect what is true and what is invented in a global fiction. This sorting 
out of the text into true and false statements seems to me incompatible 
with the experience of narrative immersion (Schaeffer 1999, Ryan 2001), 
because each statement must be evaluated separately, and this process 
destroys the semantic unity of the content that the text offers to the 
imagination.  
In world-based approaches, readers are concerned with the mental 
construction of the storyworld, rather than with the evaluation of 
individual propositions. This world is constructed on the basis of all the 
propositions asserted in the text, as well as on the basis of what I have 
called the principle of minimal departure (Ryan 1991)3. It does not 
matter whether a proposition is true or false in the real world: 
everything the text asserts about individual entities – that is, every 
proposition with an existential quantifier – must be taken as true in the 
fictional world. In extreme cases, every proposition asserted by the text 
could be true of the real world, but the text would still be fiction if the 
author presents it as such, thereby declining responsibility for the real-
world truth of the text. Insofar as storyworlds are constructed on the 
basis of all the propositions asserted in the text4, they are ontologically 
homogeneous5. Within the world of War and Peace, there is no 
ontological difference between Pierre, Natacha, Napoleon and General 
 
3 This principle, which is inspired by Lewis’ proposal for assessing the 
truth value of statements about fiction (1978), instructs readers to imagine the 
fictional world as the closest possible to (their representation of) the real 
world, and to make only those changes that are mandated by the text. 
4 Minus some of those asserted by unreliable narrators, though most of 
the declarations of unreliable narrators must be accepted as constitutive of the 
storyworld, otherwise there would be nothing for the reader to imagine. 
Unreliable narration mainly consists of objectionable judgments, and it is very 
rare for narrators to be wrong about facts. 
5 An exception to this rule is the case of embedded fictions: the characters 
of a fiction within a fiction – such as the stories told by Scheherazade in The 
Arabian Nights – are fictional from the point of view of the characters of the 
embedding fiction, who regard themselves as real. 
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Kutuzov, since all of them are real persons within this world. It is only 
when readers de-immerse themselves from the storyworld, and look at 
it from an external perspective – the perspective of the real world – that 
they make a distinction between characters that are born fictional, and 
characters imported from reality. While the rhetorical approach is better 
at explaining how people can extract knowledge from fiction, the world 
approach is better at explaining the reader’s imaginative experience.  
An issue that causes problems for both the rhetorical and the 
world-based theories of fiction (and in fact, for any theory that attempts 
to define fiction and therefore to set a boundary between fiction and its 
other), is the existence of texts of uncertain status with respect to the 
fiction/fact binary. If a trend can be detected in recent literary narrative, 
it is the increase of verifiable statements. I am thinking not just of 
realistic novels and historical fiction, but of texts like Maus by Art 
Spiegelman (to which I will return later), In Cold Blood by Truman 
Capote, which narrates a true crime using some novelistic techniques 
such as dialogues or representation of the characters’ private thoughts, 
and My Struggle by Karl Ove Knausgaard, which is called a novel but 
consists mostly of autobiographical material and could just as well have 
been called a memoir. The existence of such texts has led to the 
frequently heard claim that the border between fact and fiction is 
collapsing.  
These transgressions, or hybridizations, raise indeed the question 
of why we still need a border. Rather than trying to draw a strict 
dividing line between fact and fiction, why not arrange narrative texts 
along a continuum, based on the proportion of truth and invention? This 
continuum would look like figure 1a below. On the left, we have 
strongly factual narrative genres such as historiography, biography, 
court testimonies and news reports, which must rely on documented 
facts and adhere narrowly to the truth. One step to the right, we find 
genres that represent what I call low factuality, such as autobiography, 
memoir, and conversational narratives. Autobiography and memoirs 
contrasts with biography and history in that authors can make assertions 
about the main character (i.e. themselves) without documenting them, 
since they are the only one to know. The unreliability of memory makes 
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it often impossible to tell what is true and what is not, especially when 
the author dwells on deeply private matters. Conversational narratives 
such as gossip or narratives of personal experience are told to be 
believed but they must also entertain the audience. These conflicting 
goals often lead storytellers to play loose with the truth. For instance, 
dialogues enliven the performance, but the audience does not expect 
from the storyteller to remember conversations precisely: it is good 
enough to report what people could have said. Next on the scale are the 
narratives I have mentioned above as hybrids of truth and invention—
In Cold Blood, My Struggle, and Maus. Further to right are novels that 
place non-existing characters in a realistic historical setting. Then we 
have science fiction, fantasy, and to the extreme right, nonsense texts 
such as Lewis Carroll’s poem Jabberwocky or texts that could never be 
true of the real world because they contain logical contradictions. The 
criterion that orders these texts concerns the possibility of their 
actualization, or if one prefers, their distance from the real world. 
 
Figure 1 - Gradual and binary models of the fact / fiction distinction 
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According to this model, standard narrative fiction occupies the 
right side of the continuum, factual narrative the left side, and hybrid 
experimental texts are somewhere in the middle. But there is one big 
problem with this account. It classifies texts according to their relation 
to reality, but it does not take into consideration the author’s intent, nor 
the user’s awareness of this intent. Therefore, it cannot distinguish 
fiction from lies and error, both of which also depart from reality. This 
equation of fiction with falsity corresponds to a widespread non-
technical, “naïve” use of the term fiction, demonstrated by Donald 
Trump when he labelled Fear, a book by Bob Woodward that depicts the 
dysfunctionality of the Trump White House, “a work of fiction”. Writing 
fiction was of course very far from Woodward’s intent, whether or not 
his book contains inaccuracies. Fictionality is not a matter of degree of 
truth of a text with respect to reality, it is a matter of framing6. The exact 
same content can be presented as fact or as fiction, though when it is 
published as fact, it will be subjected to different criteria of validity than 
when it is published as fiction. This ambivalence can be demonstrated 
by the case of A Million Little Pieces by James Frey, a text which chronicles 
the narrator’s drug addiction and recovery. It was originally published 
as a memoir and selected by the Oprah Winfrey book club for the non-
fiction category. But a scandal erupted when many inaccuracies and 
fabrications were discovered, and Winfrey withdrew her endorsement 
because the book did not fulfil the truth requirements of a memoir. 
Nowadays A Million Little Pieces is published as a novel, and though the 
text is exactly the same, the controversy has abated. What this example 
demonstrates, is that the divide between factual and fictional narrative 
is far more rigid than the continuum model suggests, and that it does 
not depend on the truth of the text. Factuality is a matter of degree, since 
representations of the real world can be more or less true, but fictionality 
is not: realistic and historical fiction is no less fictional than the genres 
on the extreme right side, such as fantasy and science fiction. 
 
6 This framing is usually performed through a paratextual label implying 
fictionality or factuality (“novel”, “memoir”). But when there is no such label, 
the classification of the text is problematic. 
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Every serious theory of fictionality postulates a binary distinction 
between the texts of the right side and the texts of the left side. This 
distinction has been conceived in various ways. For the rhetorical theory 
(2015), fictionality is a matter of signaled invention, as opposed to 
hidden invention (deceit) and non-invention (fact). For Searle (1975), the 
distinction is a matter of sincere vs. pretended assertion. For Walton 
(1990), factual texts are offered to be believed and fiction is offered for 
make-believe. For Noël Carroll (1996), authors of factual discourse assert 
propositions and authors of fiction present them unasserted. For world-
based theories, nonfiction refers to the real world and fiction creates an 
alternate possible world. These accounts do not admit degree: either you 
signal your invention, or you hide it. Either you pretend to perform 
speech acts, or you do it seriously. Either you refer to the actual world, 
or you build and refer to an alternate possible world.  
The binary theories are certainly a step above the continuum 
model, since they propose an account of fiction that distinguishes it from 
lies and errors, but they are not perfect. By placing texts either on the 
right or left side of the divide (figure 1b), they encounter difficulties with 
texts that combine features from fiction and factual narrative, and that 
different users will classify differently. Virtually everybody will agree 
that a classical Napoleon biography—one that is accepted by historians 
as a serious work—belongs on the left, even if the author engages in 
speculations of the type “what if”, such as “what if Blücher had not been 
able to connect with Wellington at Waterloo?”7 And virtually everybody 
will place War and Peace on the right side of the divide, despite Tolstoy’s 
claim to make valid statements about history. (A very long ending 
exposes his philosophy of history and why he believes that Napoleon 
could never have conquered Russia.) 
 
7 Counterfactual (“what if”) statements are regarded as fiction by the 
rhetorical theory, but not by world-based theories, because they only construct 
nonactual possible worlds in order to say something about the real world 
(Lewis 1973), and they do not invite readers to contemplate an imaginary 
world for its own sake. 
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But what about works like In Cold Blood, My Struggle, or especially 
Maus by Art Spiegelman? A case can be made for Maus as a historical 
work: Spiegelman recorded his conversations with his father, an 
Auschwitz survivor, and he stayed as close as he could to his father’s 
testimony. Many people, including myself, read the graphic narrative in 
order to get an idea of the Holocaust experience. The historical truth of 
the narrative is a major source of its appeal, and a major form of the 
reader’s curiosity. But a case can also be made for its fictionality. Maus 
presents a world inhabited not by humans but by cats and mice and dogs 
and frogs. These characters behave like humans, but they still look like 
animals. So how does the reader imagine the storyworld of Maus: is it a 
world inhabited by speaking animals who behave like humans—like the 
world of one of La Fontaine’s or Aesop’s fables? In this case it would 
clearly be a fictional world. Or is it a world inhabited by Nazis who 
pursue Jews like cats hunt mice? In this case one could say that in the 
storyworld of Maus there are no cats nor mice nor other animals (except 
for the attack dogs kept by the Auschwitz guards), there are only Nazis 
and Jews and other identities. The visual representations of Nazis as cats 
and Jews as mice would be like a visual metaphor: when somebody says 
of my friend Bill that he is a donkey, I do not imagine Bill with long grey 
ears, I assume that the speaker means that he is stupid. But the 
interpretation of the cats and mice as visual metaphors ignores the 
graphic nature of the medium. Visual media give less freedom to the 
imagination than language-based ones, because unlike language, they 
consist of sensory data that force the mind to visualize things the way 
they are represented in the text. If I imagine the world of Maus visually, 
I will imagine it with cats and mice, and if somebody was going to 
expand the world of Maus through fan fiction, this fan would draw a 
cartoon with cats and mice. We cannot make the cats and mice disappear 
from the imagination by saying that they are just metaphors, or 
allegories, because they are the main source of the text’s artistic 
innovation. 
This ambiguity explains why nobody has an easy time classifying 
Maus as either fact or fiction. As Marianne Hirsch notes, “the Pulitzer 
prize committee invented a special category for Maus, suggesting the 
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impossibility of categorizing it as either fiction or nonfiction” (1997: 274). 
Nancy Pedri (2013) writes that such texts are neither fact nor fiction 
(figure 1c). But this verdict gives readers no reason to be interested in 
Maus: if it is not fact, it does not contribute to their knowledge; but if it 
is not fiction, its world is not worth imagining for its own sake. The 
rhetorical theory would say that Maus consists of both fictional 
elements—the animals—and non-fictional ones—the narrative based on 
the father’s testimony. This explanation works on the micro-level, but 
the theory also postulates a macro-level on which a decision must be 
made: is Maus a global fiction that contains lots of facts, or a global 
factual narrative that contains lots of invention? The theory gives no 
reason to choose one of these interpretations over the other. 
My own solution to this dilemma says that a work like Maus 
combines the appeal of fiction and fact (figure 1d). We read fictions for 
the sake of the pleasure we take in imagining the storyworld. We read 
factual narratives for the sake of getting information about the real 
world, which means for the sake of acquiring knowledge. Why should 
these two types of motivation be incompatible with each other? The 
alternative to regarding Maus as neither fiction nor fact is to make the 
territories of fiction and fact overlap, so that hybrid texts can find a 
home, without giving up the advantage of a clear distinction between 
fact and fiction. In the zone of overlap, I place not only Maus, but In Cold 
Blood, My Struggle and New Journalism8. The overlap model explains 
why some people call these works factual, others call them fictional, and 
still others do not know.  
It could be objected that postulating an overlap is an ad hoc solution 
that denies the specificity of fiction. A definition that works for both 
 
8 A different situation occurs in texts that are clearly marked collages of 
fact and fiction. For instance, the novel Lincoln in the Bardo by George Saunders 
combines quotations about Lincoln borrowed from historical texts with 
fantastic dialogues between the people buried in the cemetery where Lincoln’s 
young son, Willie, has been laid to rest. This novel is clearly part fact, part 
fiction, and it is easy to tell which parts belong to which category. Rather than 
placing it in a zone of overlap, I would split it between two zones. 
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hybrid texts and clear representatives of fact and fiction would certainly 
be more satisfactory, but such a definition would have to be at the same 
time gradual and binary—which means, it would have to resolve a 
logical contradiction. I see no way of doing this. Figure 1 captures all the 
possibilities (except for the possibility of giving up any distinction 
between truth and fiction), and I have shown that options (a), (b) and (c) 
all present significant weaknesses, so this leaves only (d). The lesson to 
be drawn from the case of hybrid texts is that there is no perfect theory 
of fictionality that answers all the questions one might want to ask. 
Every theory is inspired by a desire to account for a certain type of 
phenomenon: the world-based theories try to capture the imaginative 
experience of readers, players or spectators of fiction; the rhetorical 
theory wants to show that the mental operations that underlie culturally 
recognized fictional genres also appear spontaneously in other types of 
discourse. Once a definition has been crafted, it can be used as a heuristic 
device to make decisions about marginal cases. But no theory can be 
valid unless it is able to account for the difference between War and Peace 
and The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, or between Lord of the Rings 
and The Mueller Report. This difference has to do with expectations of 
truth. In a time when concepts such as post-truth (McIntire 2018) and 
truthiness threaten to replace the distinction between fact and fiction 
with panfictionality (Ryan 1997), i.e. with the idea that all texts are 
fabrication, it is imperative, as Lavocat (2016) forcefully argues, to 
defend the border. 
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